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Abstract 
Recent international events sparked renewed academic interest for the European Union’s 
Common Foreign and Security Policy, particularly towards the Arab world. Usually, much is 
made of the normative power of the Union and of its role in exporting the values of 
democratic governance and human rights. It follows that the policies of the Union in specific 
regions are judged according to the parameters of liberal idealism. This paper challenges 
such an assumption and argues that a structural realist interpretation of the Union’s tentative 
foreign policy makes a decisive contribution to better understand and evaluate what the 
Union ‘does’ abroad. The paper is specifically concerned with the Euro-Mediterranean 
Partnership and how, contrary to the liberal idealist values of CFSP, it helps securitising the 
Mediterranean through the promotion and support of political authoritarianism in the partner 
countries. The case of Morocco is discussed in detail.   
Zusammenfassung 
Die jüngsten Entwicklungen auf der internationalen Ebene haben das akademische 
Interesse an der „Gemeinsamen Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik“ (GASP) der Europäischen 
Union verstärkt, insbesondere im Hinblick auf die Politik der EU gegenüber der arabischen 
Welt. In diesem Zusammenhang wird häufig auf die Rolle der EU als normativer Akteur 
hingewiesen und ihre Bedeutung bei der Verbreitung von Demokratie und Menschenrechten 
betont. Die Politik der EU gegenüber bestimmten Regionen wird also vor dem Hintergrund 
des Liberalen Idealismus betrachtet. Der vorliegende Beitrag stellt diese Sichtweise in 
Frage. Er argumentiert stattdessen, dass eine am strukturellen Realismus orientierte 
Interpretation der GASP einen wichtigen Beitrag zum besseren Verständnis der EU-
Außenbeziehung leisten kann. Anhand der Euro-Mediterranen Partnerschaft, und 
insbesondere am Beispiel der EU-Politik gegenüber Marokko, zeigen wir, dass die EU – 
entgegen den liberal-idealistischen Werten der GASP – autoritäre Regime in den 
Partnerländern unterstützt und fördert, um auf diese Weise den Mittelmeerraum zu sichern. 
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Introduction 
The European Union’s limited foreign policy activity has usually been linked to the ‘soft’ 
issues of international politics such as conducting negotiations on international trade 
agreements, promoting international legality and human rights and supporting processes of 
democratisation. In the early 1980s, for instance, the then European Communities exercised 
an indirect positive influence on regime transformation in countries of Southern Europe by 
acting as a magnet for democracy (Whitehead, 1996).  
More recently however, the role of the EU has changed quite radically and the EU 
has become a more pro-active entity with a much more coherent and extensive range of 
foreign policy objectives, including a European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). The 
European Union has become a more vocal actor in international affairs as a result of the 
deepening of integration and the transformations of the global security environment, leading 
the Union to play a role in the field of international security. This role is based on a 
conceptualisation of security resting on the theoretical assumption that international stability 
and security can only be achieved through the promotion of the norms upon which the EU 
itself is built: legally binding treaties, multilateral institutions, democratic governance and 
economic interpenetration.  
Since the mid-1990s, one of the most important target areas for the Union in terms of 
foreign and security policy has been the Mediterranean basin and the pillar of this policy has 
been the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. This policy is being carried out under three 
headings: the first is a political and security partnership with an emphasis on the rule of law, 
respect for human rights and pluralism; the second and most detailed is an economic and 
financial partnership, which attaches importance to “sustainable and balanced economic and 
social development with a view to achieving the objective of creating an area of shared 
prosperity” (Barcelona Declaration, 1995); and the third is a partnership in social, cultural 
and human affairs with an emphasis on the rejection of the notion of the clash of civilisations 
in favour of a dialogue between cultures. At the very core of this initiative is the promotion of 
all that is associated with western-liberal democracy, from the traditional electoral 
procedures to the respect for individual rights to the implementation of a market economy. All 
this combined should lead to the creation of an area of stability profitable to both the EU and 
the countries on the southern bank of the Mediterranean, where the notion of security seems 
to be inevitably linked with democracy.   
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 In light of recent international events, it is apparent that “now security in the 
Mediterranean has attained a higher profile” (Biscop, 2003: vii). Ten years after its launch, a 
number of academics and EU policy-makers have been rather disappointed with the results 
achieved through the Barcelona process, which, they claim, has not been very successful in 
achieving its core objectives (Youngs, 2003). At a recent workshop, attended by policy-
makers and scholars, the “Barcelona process has been classified as a diplomatic rather than 
substantive success” (Echague and Youngs, 2005: 234). This is particularly the case for the 
very sensitive issues of democracy, human rights and rule of law, which have not made 
much progress in the Arab partner countries.  
A number of reasons have been offered for this, ranging from the internal divisions 
among member states that impede the formulation of clear policies to the weakness of the 
institutional set-up to the ability of target countries to devise survival strategy intended to 
preserve the current elites in power. The starting assumption of all these explanations is that 
the European Union per se is actually genuinely interested in the promotion of democratic 
governance as a provider of security and that its actions in the region fail because of 
realpolitik factors that somehow ‘get in the way’. In this respect, many display an attitude of 
faith towards the conflation of democracy and security that the EU declares to uphold. 
This research proposes instead to look at the European Union not as the wholly 
normative actor that many claim it to be, but as an international actor that makes rationalistic 
assumptions about its material interests as well as its normative ones. In this context the 
Barcelona process might not be the failure that many highlight, but might be the means 
through which the European Union and its member states have been able to maintain 
stability and security in the region while increasing their material benefits. Due to the 
extensive and, at times, contradictory list of objectives of the Barcelona process, it is 
possible to hypothesise that the way through which the overall policy is assessed depends 
on the theoretical approach one adopts for understanding the EU. If one espouses the 
predominant normative view that the EU has of itself and of its actions, it is true that the EMP 
did not achieve the lofty objectives of development, democratisation and therefore security. 
However, if one adopts a different theoretical perspective, the assessment of the overall 
policy might not be the same. While there is no reason why democracy, stability and security 
might not be synonymous, the specific measures put in place through EMP seem to make 
the pursuit of these goals inexorably irreconcilable and, at the same time, indicate that what 
is believed to be ‘security’ is prioritised over all other objectives.    
 The first part of the paper builds on Richard Youngs’s work (2004: 415-435) and 
attempts to challenge the current literature on the normative power of the European Union 
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and postulates that the EU is a rationalistic actor pursuing both normative and interest-based 
outcomes. This is so not only because member-states have a very important role in the 
institutional structure of the EU, but also because the formally independent institutions are 
forced to operate in a ‘realist’ international environment. In a recent article, Adrian Hyde-
Price (2006) emphasised the importance of “the systemic determinants of EU foreign and 
security policy”. The second part will look at how the EU operates in one particular target 
country: Morocco. The Kingdom of Morocco is a good case study because it has a very 
close relationship with and high dependence on the EU and constitutes a privileged partner 
on a vast range of policy issues. The perceived lack of success of the Barcelona process in 
this moderately authoritarian country is therefore all the more striking because it is precisely 
in these ‘liberalised autocracies’ (Brumberg, 2003) where one would expect to see 
considerable changes after 10 years of EU engagement.  
EMP: the Normative Power of the European Union?  
 With the end of the Cold War, the European Union deepened its integration and a 
common external policy was launched to respond to new and expanded security challenges. 
Amidst the political and strategic uncertainties that the international system presented states 
with at the time, “one of the most prominent themes of Europe’s transformed security 
situation during this period was the value attached to democracy promotion and human 
rights” (Rye Olsen, 2002: 132). This strategy of the promotion of democracy through 
economic development on the part of the European Union has been perceived as both more 
genuine and more successful than the one other states undertook. For instance, the United 
States had accorded a high priority to human rights since Carter’s presidency and to 
democracy-promotion since Reagan’s presidency (Huntington, 1991), but the very basis 
upon which they were built and their implementation has been very controversial (Blum, 
2000). The main problem the United States seemed to face in this respect was the 
contradiction that often emerged between pursuing a normative policy of democracy-
promotion with the requirements of a realist foreign policy characterised by a narrow concept 
of security, which almost always won out. This has been particularly evident in the Middle 
East, where a range of authoritarian regimes continues to this day to receive strong backing 
from Washington (Hudson, 2005). What is true for the United States is also true for other 
large European countries when acting unilaterally. Their democracy-promotion strategies 
often compete with the requirement of pursuing material interests and are therefore 
undermined and emptied of their significance and impact (Cavatorta, 2001).  
4 — Cavatorta / Chari / Kritzinger / The European Union and Morocco — I H S 
 
 The European Union is not perceived as suffering from the same difficulties of 
reconciling normative and material interests because, as an international actor, it is 
considered to be and perceives itself as being wholly normative. The Union, it is argued, has 
a very unique institutional structure, has an approach to international affairs that is firmly 
rooted in multilateralism and has developed an alternative approach to politics, turning away 
from old fashioned power politics and instead drawing upon international law, norms, rules, 
cooperation and integration (Tonra and Cavatorta, 2003). It is this normative power that the 
Union now exerts (Manners, 2002). In this context, it is only natural that the European Union 
is a leading actor when it comes to promoting a specific understanding of security, which is 
unique because it relies solely on notions of economic development and democratisation 
rather than on necessary alliances with unsavoury authoritarian regimes for the pursuit of 
more immediate gains. Its own history is about the expansion of the area of democracy 
through democratic and legitimate international means and this, in theory, sets it apart from 
all other international actors. According to such a view, it was inevitable that the Union would 
attempt to export its own model of integration to achieve, through economic development, 
democratic change in other regions of the globe. The outcome of such a strategy would also 
be the self-interested achievement of perpetual ‘Kantian’ security. Thus, when the EU ‘does’ 
security, it relies on a ‘cooperative approach’ with the target countries in the region it 
operates in.    
The Mediterranean basin, in turmoil since the mid 1980s, represented by the mid-
1990s a priority area where to act and, through the Barcelona process, the European Union 
attempted to export its own model without imposing it. As Hollis points out “the focus is on 
dialogue the EU undertakes to assist with indigenously-generated reform programmes” 
(2005: 321). According to Biscop “the EMP is an attempt to do away with the idea of the 
Mediterranean as a frontier and to make it once again a crossroads of ideas” (2003: viii). 
 Ten years after its launch, the results of EMP have largely been deemed 
unsatisfactory when it comes to the developmental, democratic and security achievements of 
the partner countries and this is what leads a number of authors to present the whole 
process as being a failure. What has occupied both policy-makers and scholars concerned 
with the state of EMP have been the reasons for this failure. A number of explanations have 
been suggested. The first type of explanations focuses on the survival strategies of the 
partner countries, which have largely been able to defuse democratic pressures, while 
hijacking the benefits of economic reforms. According to Hollis, some Europeans contend 
that “Arab elites have proved adaptive at maintaining their relatively privileged positions […] 
and governments have resisted European efforts to support civil society, democracy and 
human rights movements” (2005: 320). Another explanation concentrates on the inherent 
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weakness of EU strategies due to the overbearing role of member states in foreign policy 
matters. Thus, what undermines EMP is the same type of diverging interests that member 
states pursued during the recent Iraq war (Chari and Cavatorta, 2003) and leads to the 
pursuit of material interests through the EU structures (Morisse-Schlibach, 1999), 
undermining its normative spirit. This is further complicated by the divergent interests and 
preferences that different member states have. This makes EMP structurally weak and quite 
‘schizophrenic’. A third explanation concentrates on the failure of the Middle East Peace 
process, whose repercussions in the area impede lasting security arrangements and 
domestic change in Arab countries (Biscop, 2003). Finally, there are constitutional 
explanations for the ineffectiveness of the EU in this policy area: the structure of the 
decision-making process is too complex and the institutional participants too diverse to have 
a coordinated policy (Philippart, 2003). If we add that the interests of member states also 
have to be incorporated, the result is a rather incoherent strategy with little chance of being 
successfully implemented.  
These explanations are quite distinct, but have a common premise; they all assume 
that the Union per se has a genuine interest in promoting economic development and 
democracy in order to achieve security at its borders. 
It is at this theoretical juncture that analysts emphasise that the EMP’s normative 
objectives are undermined by the realist imperatives of the member states. This 
interpretation derives from the fact that many observers seem unable to look at the EU itself 
through traditional realist concepts of international relations and are satisfied with the 
definition of the EU as a normative power.   
From this, it follows that the rather substantial inconsistencies that exist between the 
declared end goal of the EU in the Mediterranean (the creation of an area of shared 
prosperity and democracy) and the policies used to achieve that objective are due to the fact 
that while the EU is attempting to do the ‘right thing’ member states and partners go ‘behind 
the back’ of the EU and act according to a realpolitik logic.  
What is left un-explored is the fact that the original assumption may be partially 
wrong. The EU may well be a normative actor, but rationalistic/realist features can be 
attributed to the EU as well because they are not the exclusive domain of nation-states. In 
his recent work on the EU external policies Youngs argues that “greater emphasis and 
precision are needed to understand the factors that suggest strategic calculation within the 
broader parameters of value-informed policies” (2004: 421). In his analysis Youngs 
suggested that three criteria be used to evaluate the degree of realism behind the EU 
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external policies: strategies employed, degree of instrumental reasoning behind the use of 
norms and the nature of the policy-making process. Youngs (2004: 421) utilises these criteria 
to evaluate the human rights policies put in place by the Commission and convincingly 
demonstrates that the EU is not only about norms, but also about material interests, which 
are fostered and justified through norms.  
Thus, it is possible to hypothesise that the strategies put in place through the Euro-
Mediterranean partnership are achieving the results they are meant to achieve if we think of 
the EU as a traditional international actor desiring regional stability with a traditional concept 
of security. In this context, the promotion of real economic and democratic changes in the 
region is perceived as potentially destabilising and threatening for the EU, particularly in the 
short term. Political and security issues were always the priority for the EU, which was and 
still is fundamentally unprepared to deal with the consequences of following up on its 
declarations. Accordingly, the emphasis on the causal mechanism development / democracy 
/ security simply represents an intentional rhetorical device designed to convey a different 
message from the one conveyed by other actors, but it is not a policy framework the EU truly 
intends to act upon. Vasconcelos (2005) argues that “it was implicitly understood that the key 
security problem was political Islam” and this is what is at the core of EU thinking. The 
conceptualisation of the adversarial nature of the opposition in the Arab members of the 
Partnership is a fundamental stumbling block in the relationship, which undermines the pro-
democracy initiatives of the EU. The low priority that democratic change has in the EU 
agenda is reflected in the type of policies that are pursued, privileging dialogue and co-
operation with the partner regimes, which are under pressure from their own domestic 
constituencies for being ‘illegitimate’ representatives of their countries’ interests. To a certain 
extent, the EU can still claim to be a norm-exporting actor while, at the same time, obtaining 
material benefits and strengthening its security, but the strains are becoming obvious.  
The dissatisfaction that exists with EMP among scholars and external observers is 
due to the fact that through their analyses they correctly point to major inconsistencies within 
the policy itself. However, such dissatisfaction does not lead to the theoretical questioning of 
the EU as a normative power and the blame for the shortcomings rests primarily with the 
member-states. This neglects the fact that EU policy-making areas are not the exclusive 
hunting ground of members. There is in fact a very complex game, which takes place among 
the different institutional actors within the EU and the Commission can contribute to shaping 
it. Some scholars on EU policy-making argue that mostly EU institutions shape and constrain 
intergovernmental policy-making (Pierson, 1996), while others de-emphasise the importance 
of EU institutions, and rather argue that the EU represents a system of multi-level 
governance, in which member governments amongst many sub-national and supranational 
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actors act in a complex and unique system of governance (Marks et al., 1996). This latter 
approach would have the Commission occupy a significant position in this multi-level 
governance, because it has both the expertise and the knowledge to influence the stances of 
some of the member states with respect to EMP. In addition, it can be hypothesised that the 
EU bureaucracy dealing with questions of foreign and security policy is very much influenced 
by the dominant realist conceptualisations of international relations and acts accordingly.  
If we then interpret EMP and its launch as the product of both normative and realist 
thinking, what many believe to be a failed policy in need of substantial revisions and 
coherence may actually end up looking like a rather cunning and successful plan to achieve 
stability and security in a volatile region. Frédéric Volpi recently highlighted some of these 
issues and stated that within a realist framework, “the assessment of the EU would be that 
stable regimes running their national economy efficiently in the Middle East and North Africa 
provide the best means of obtaining a well-policed zone of regional security and prosperity” 
(2004: 151). While a realist interpretation of EMP is certainly restricted and does not capture 
the complexities of the policy (Attinà, 2003), it should be emphasised that a rationalistic 
perspective of what the EU does in the Mediterranean through the Barcelona process allows 
analysts to avoid the trap of reconciling the dichotomy between stated objectives and 
policies implemented to achieve them. This is becoming particularly evident after the 
changes in global security perceptions after the September 11th attacks in the US, but more 
specifically for the EU, in the launch of the European Security Strategy (ESS, 2003) and the 
European Neighbourhood’ policy.  The manner with which the ESS identifies and proposes 
to deal with the key threats to its security makes the Arab partners in EMP the natural and 
only interlocutors, defeating therefore the stated assumption that the only viable type of 
security can be achieved through democratising the periphery of Europe. There are for 
instance no specific references to ‘bad governance’ regarding any of the partners, criticism 
being reserved for countries such as Somalia and Liberia. Similarly, the European 
Neighbourhood Policy is unmistakably framed in terms of interests. There is for instance 
“close cooperation with the neighbours in order to enable the EU to provide security and 
welfare to its citizens as well as the effective control of borders” (Del Sarto and Schumacher, 
2005: 7).   
Thus, once the normative aspect is marginalised, a clearer assessment of the 
impact on security of the policies pursued through EMP can emerge. The following section 
will analyse EU policies in Morocco in this specific context. If the assumption that the EU is 
partially interest-driven is correct, there should be evidence that what the EU ‘does’ in the 
partner country strengthens rather than weakens the regime. Effective democracy-promotion 
is conventionally based on support for the opposition in its demands for political reforms and 
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on the denial of legitimacy to the current authoritarian ruler. This does not entail a radical 
confrontational approach, which may be detrimental to change, but does entail that a certain 
‘distance’ be maintained vis-a-vis the ruling elites. If our assumption is correct, the 
expectation is that the European Union considers the current ruler of Morocco as the true 
partner in the process of democratisation and that the aid given to Morocco is passed 
through official channels, thereby strengthening the authoritarian regime.  
To conclude, there should be evidence of the following: a) EU policy-makers have a 
very clear understanding of what constitutes a security threat, i.e. political Islam; b) 
accordingly, the privileged interlocutors of the EU become the authoritarian government and 
‘secular’ opposition parties that have very little independent following; c) in order to 
strengthen the incumbents, EU funding and aid is given mostly through ‘official’ 
governmental channels and; d) hard security concerns take precedence over other forms of 
interaction.  
If such evidence is found as regards EU policy towards Morocco, it could be argued 
that the EU, far from being the victim of member states, is independently pursuing a policy 
that is framed through traditional conceptualisations of security, relying, when needed, on 
authoritarian states to achieve its goals. This would also explain the misplaced focus on 
economic liberalisation as a launching pad for democratic reforms, in the knowledge that 
such a causal mechanism is at best tenuous, if not counterproductive (Cameron and Wise, 
2004). Therefore EU policies seem to contribute to the survival of the regimes by providing 
them with the resources necessary to fend off challenges from the opposition. At the same 
time, the EU obtains its most preferred outcome and can still claim that it is promoting 
democracy. It is no wonder that “for Arab civil society, this has often been perceived as a 
cynical pact between Europe and the Arab regimes to consolidate the political status quo” 
(Danreuther, 2005). 
 
The EU and Morocco: security through stable 
authoritarianism 
 Ten years of engagement with the Arab partners have not altered the security 
dilemma central to the understanding of the Partnership itself and the contradictions that 
characterise the policy. At the heart of the Partnership there always was ‘political Islam’ in all 
its manifestations. Even before EMP was launched, it was argued that “threats to European 
security [would] arise not from malevolent state power but rather from a complete or partial 
breakdown of state authority on the other side of the Mediterranean” (Mortimer, 1994: 109). 
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With this warning in mind, the European institutions came to see the advances made by 
Islamist movements as destabilising and potentially very dangerous for the entire 
Mediterranean basin, as their coming to power would have led, according to some scenarios, 
to the quest for nuclear weapons, the creation of safe havens for terrorists, to mass 
migration and the undermining of the Middle East Peace Process. These fears have been 
increased in more recent times by a new brand of transnational terrorism and political 
violence produced by radical Islamist groups from the Maghreb, which is believed to threaten 
the domestic stability of the Arab partners.  
 With this assumption in mind, the inevitable consequence for any European initiative 
in the area to obtain security ultimately rested in an ‘unsavoury’ alliance with autocratic and 
‘illegitimate’ rulers in partner countries, limiting the scope for achieving security through 
democracy. Given that “the possibility of a direct attack on the Union as a whole or on 
anyone of its member states [could] be practically ruled out” (Algieri in Biscop, 1996), the 
other security objectives such as avoiding domestic instability on the southern bank, 
controlling mass migration, ensuring non-proliferation and conducting an effective ‘war on 
terrorism’ could be achieved only through strictly cooperating with authoritarian regimes. This 
overarching policy framework impacted negatively on the declared strategy of achieving 
security through economic development and democracy. If the European Union were truly 
attempting to promote a concept of security based on economic development and 
democratisation, we should see a form of economic cooperation that does not benefit the 
current governing elites, we should see the use of conditionality when a partner country 
‘misbehaves’, we should see a positive engagement with opposition parties and we should 
see a freeze on cooperative military and police agreements that only strengthen illegitimate 
security services.  
However, this does not seem to be the case; quite the contrary. The declarations and 
active policies regarding the promotion of economic and political reforms have, since the 
beginning of the Partnership, taken place within a very well defined security framework, 
whereby real democratic legitimacy, which should in theory be at the heart of peaceful 
relations among states according to the values of the European Union, would not be 
bestowed upon Islamist movement of any sort. As Holden recently stated, “the latent and 
actual political crises, economic stagnation and rapid population growth rendered it 
necessary for the EU to take a leadership role in the region if it wanted to avoid instability 
(and migration) spreading northwards” (2005: 22). Thus, from the beginning, very real 
security concerns were at the roots of the policy, leading to a rather clear “hierarchy of 
objectives” (Schmid, 2004). With this in mind, the EMP can be better understood as a policy 
attempting to achieve security objectives through supporting authoritarianism. In this respect, 
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the achievement of security goals is the imperative and this is obtained through a number of 
specific policies that strengthen the incumbents in the Arab partners, as they are the 
privileged interlocutors charged with delivering on the security matters of importance to the 
Union. In turn, such incumbents capitalise on their gate-keeping position to extract resources 
from the EU.     
What does security mean for the European Union? With “no country adjoining the 
EU territory […] regarded as a military threat today” (Aliboni, 2005: 1), the Union has focused 
its attention on what can be considered soft security issues such as terrorism, migration, 
illegal trafficking or organised crime. The necessity to deal with these issues and the fact that 
they are bound up with the larger problem of political Islam make the Partnership much more 
security oriented than previously believed. If we take into account that the Union has also 
“hegemonic tendencies” (Attinà, 2003) when it comes to the pursuit of material economic 
benefits, the Partnership seems to be much more a realist enterprise than a genuine attempt 
to create an area of peace, security and stability.  
The case of Morocco highlights all the apparent shortcomings of the partnership, but, 
at the same time, also indicates, if a different framework of understanding is adopted, how 
successful EMP has been in achieving short-term security through authoritarianism. A useful 
starting point regarding the relationship between Morocco and the European Union is a short 
analysis of the nature of the Moroccan regime, which, after ten years of engagement with the 
EU, is still quite strongly authoritarian, poor and more ‘Islamicised’ than ever before. In terms 
of democratic governance, the holding of elections does not per se mean that such elections 
actually matter when it comes to effective policy-making. In a recent interview, Moroccan 
constitutionalist Omar Bendorou confirmed that in light of the present constitution “all power 
is really in the hands of the King” (Le Journal Hebdomadaire 2005: 28). In addition, the 
elections, as mentioned earlier, exclude one of the leading opposition movements, while the 
legal Islamist formation (the PJD) exercises self-restraint and self-censorship on a number of 
issues and policies. In terms of human rights, Morocco has a very poor record. In a recent 
report Amnesty International discerned that “the sharp rise in reported cases of torture or ill-
treatment in the context of ‘counter-terrorism’” (2004). Non-governmental organisations have 
not been the only ones to publish such damning reports and one of Morocco’s closest allies, 
the United States, felt it necessary to criticise Morocco’s record on human rights quite 
severely (Le Journal Hebdomadaire, March 2005: 8). For its part, the European Union has 
generally preferred to highlight ‘positive developments’ in the political situation of the country 
emphasising new legislation aimed at improving individual liberties. According to the strategy 
document published in December 2001 the EU believed that “significant progress in terms of 
individual freedoms and fundamental rights” had been made. While this might have been 
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true following the changes introduced by the late king Hassan II in the course of his last few 
years in power (Willis, 1999), the report does not take into account the very strong 
deterioration of the situation since the terrorist attacks on September 11th, 2001 and, even 
more significantly, after the Casablanca bombings of May 2003. To conclude, it is now quite 
evident that Morocco does not satisfy the criteria of good governance and respect for 
fundamental human rights and it seems puzzling to the believers in normative Europe as to 
why the Union does not take more forceful action on these matters. The EU has been for 
instance notably silent on the issue of thousands of Moroccan Islamists imprisoned, tortured 
and sent to jail after being convicted in show-trials reminiscent of the ones held in the 1970s 
by Hassan II.   
In fact it can be demonstrated that the EU does not seem to care very much about 
the absence of democracy and abuses of human rights, as the overarching security 
framework justifies current policy choices. Given that the EU is the stronger actor in the 
relationship, it would be expected that its normative values were more forcefully pursued. 
What we see instead is the marginalisation of issues of democracy and human rights in 
favour of other policy areas that satisfy the EU’s realpolitik concerns (Amin and El Kenz, 
2005). 
This policy of security through authoritarianism rests, in the case of Morocco, on 
strengthening the regime through two interconnected policy pillars: economic aid/reforms 
and military/police arrangements. 
Economic reforms: strengthening the regime’s grip   
Despite the clear intention for the three Barcelona baskets to be integrated, each 
has followed its own independent development (Philippart, 2003), with the economic aspect 
of the relationship being privileged. The thinking behind the integration of southern 
Mediterranean economies in the European Union’s economic sphere seemed to be that free 
trade would help these countries out of the poverty trap, reducing therefore the appeal of the 
Islamist message. At the same time, liberal reforms would be introduced with the help and 
advice of the European Union, particularly in regard to the legal system of protection and 
enhancement of human rights. In turn, these reforms would also undermine the Islamist 
discourse about the absence of democracy and lack of legitimacy of the incumbents. Such 
thinking, however, was fundamentally flawed because the EU, through its misgivings about 
fundamental regime change, has only one interlocutor: the incumbent regime. Thus, 
economic liberalisation has been pursued with some coherence because it strengthens the 
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current ruling elites around the King, enabling them to survive their domestic challenges. 
“Concrete daily management of the Partnership is very much focused on the advancement 
of the Euro-Mediterranean Free trade Area (EMFTA) project, which continues to proceed at 
quite a steady pace” (Schmid, 2004: 396), to the detriment of the other normative goals. We 
have today quite ample evidence to demonstrate that economic liberalisation has been 
successfully hijacked by the ruling elites (Dillman, 2001) and that far from triggering 
democratic openness, it has led to the creation, at best, of semi-democracies (Brumberg, 
2003) where opposition Islamists thrive on exposing the growing inequalities that the new 
economic order imposed by Europe has generated (Sheikh Yassine, 1999). In turn, this has 
a profound impact on the political system where both incumbents and European officials 
cannot easily tolerate such views because they would require a change that they are not yet 
prepared to make.  
This is demonstrated, for instance, by the amount of aid that the EU provides to the 
authoritarian Moroccan government without activating the clauses that regard human rights 
and democratic governance. Thus, “in the years 2000-2001, the following programmes were 
approved: financial sector adjustment (52 million EUR); health sector reform (50 million 
EUR); justice reform (28 million EUR); rural development in Khenifra (9 million EUR); solid 
waste management in Essaouira (2 million EUR); water sector adjustment (120 million EUR). 
Morocco has been the leading recipient among the Mediterranean partners in terms of total 
funds received from the MEDA programme”1. Overall, “under the MEDA programme Morocco 
has so far received a total of € 1,180.5 million in commitment appropriations: € 656 million 
under MEDA I (1995 - 1999) and € 524.5 million under MEDA II (2000 – 2003)”2. In addition, 
the European Investment Bank loaned Morocco, “during the period 1995 – 2002, € 1,220 
million, intended among others for construction and upgrading of highways and rural roads, 
improvements to sewerage and water management systems, rehabilitation of the railway 
network and the development of the banking sector”3. Financial aid and loans have been 
channelled through corrupt4 and authoritarian government authorities. 
Furthermore, the Association Agreement has never been suspended in spite of the 
clear lack of commitment by the Moroccan authorities to the universal values of democracy 
and human rights. Even the threat of suspension might have had positive effects on 
                                                     
1 See http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/morocco/intro/index.htm, accessed on March 29th, 2005. 
2 See http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/europeaid/projects/med/bilateral/morocco_en.htm, accessed on March 27th 
2005. 
3 See http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/europeaid/projects/med/bilateral/morocco_en.htm, accessed on March 27th 
2005. 
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Morocco’s domestic behaviour, but this never took place. This is particularly disconcerting 
fact given that the EU itself emphasises the importance of human rights and democracy. 
This evidence points to the fact that the European Union does not really seem to be 
interested in the amount and gravity of human rights abuses in Morocco, nor does it seem to 
be interested in promoting genuine democratic reforms by activating its ‘diplomatic’ and 
economic arsenal to obtain concessions in these areas.  
Securitising the relationship 
 The international events of the last few years have only contributed to the further 
prominence of security in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. Despite recent calls for 
engaging with sectors the Islamist opposition (Aliboni, 2004), there is still considerable 
reluctance to choose that path and the securitisation of many issues of concern for both the 
EU and the Arab partners has increased with the launch of the European Security Strategy 
and the Neighbourhood Policy. While the lack of democracy and the persistence of poverty 
are correctly considered to be central to the security challenges facing the Union (ESS, 
2003) such as increased migration (with the potential negative repercussion of social unrest) 
and transnational terrorism, the policies adopted to counter such threats still fall victim of the 
necessity to have the incumbents as the only possible interlocutors. In this respect the short-
term interests are privileged over the long-terms ones of true democratisation, and the 
increased attention paid to building links with security and police services on the Arab side of 
the Mediterranean are a testimony to the unwillingness of the EU to stray from the original 
path followed since 1995.  
 If the EU were truly a normative actor, we would expect it to be most reluctant to co-
ordinate security policies with discredited Moroccan institutional entities, particularly in the 
realm of police arrangements and military accords. The reality is however quite different. In 
terms of territorial disputes, Morocco and the Union have been able to settle their 
differences, particularly in recent times when the ‘war on terror’, for both actors, has been the 
real priority. The EU does not seem to take an interest in the issue of Western Sahara, with 
Spain even recognising products from that region as being, controversially, Moroccan. While 
it may seems that “relations between Spain and Morocco are negatively influenced by the 
claims of the former on the enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla” (Biscop, 2003: 2) and by disputes 
                                                                                                                                                      
4 The issue of widespread corruption is recognised by EU officials as well in their reports. See for instance the 
Report ‘Euro-Med Partnership: Morocco. Strategy Document 2002-2006’, December 2001.  
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over Perejil, these minor disagreements have been overshadowed by the cooperation taking 
place since the attacks of Casablanca and Madrid. In addition, the EU has financially 
supported the Kingdom for ‘dealing’ with illegal immigrants from Sub-Saharan Africa on its 
behalf. Morocco ranks quite highly among the countries receiving military hardware from EU 
member-states despite the existence of a European Union Code of Conduct on Arms 
Exports, which would see governments issuing licenses to export weaponry only to countries 
with solid democratic credentials. This is not really the case of Morocco, which in 2003 has 
received weapons in 13 different categories of armament under 124 export licenses. The 
European countries profiting most from such sales have been, unsurprisingly, France, 
Germany, Italy and Portugal. Morocco still spend over 4 % of its GDP on weapons. It is 
difficult to reconcile the objective of economic development and democracy with the sale of 
weapons to armed forces known for their occupation of Western Sahara for a sum of money 
that would be probably better invested in social projects. At closer inspection, such weaponry 
is not only instrumental in the upgrading of the Moroccan armed forces in the Western 
Sahara, but also in carrying out ‘duties’ whose outcome is crucial to the soft security issues 
the EU is interested in, such as migration. Thus, material is sold to better patrol the coast 
and to fortify the Spanish enclaves to stop ‘illegal aliens’ from reaching the territory of 
Europe.  
 In addition, much is made of the new special relationships that the European Union 
is building with the Arab states to counter terrorism. In a recent speech Mr. Gijs De Vries 
[2004], the EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator, argued quite strongly in favour of closer links 
with the Arab partners on the southern bank of the Mediterranean, particularly through 
cooperation with intelligence services, even though such security services are quite 
notorious for their brutal practices.        
The European Union: the new realist on the block?  
At this point it is interesting to examine the reasons for this behaviour, paying 
particular attention to the fact that if the EU is looked through ‘realist’ and rationalistic lenses, 
the explanation seems rather straightforward. 
One popular explanation for the lack of more forceful activism in the realm of 
democracy promotion and defence of human rights is that it takes time for the ‘normative 
values’ of the Union to be transmitted to the partner country. The argument is that the EU, as 
a normative actor, prefers not to be forceful in promoting its values because this might lead 
to a backlash in the partner country. Thus, the EU prefers to keep the partner ‘engaged’ over 
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a long period of time in order for the ‘osmosis’ of norms to take place. This explanation, 
however, is quite weak for two reasons. First of all, the EU has been directly and 
substantially engaged with Morocco for ten years and during this time very little has been 
achieved in terms of positive change in the partner country. If anything, the human rights 
situation seems to have worsened compared to the liberalising trends of the late 1990s and 
elections have become less ‘democratic’ in 2002 than in 1997, a year after the Association 
Agreement had been signed. Secondly, the absence of forceful action during such an 
extended period of time may signal to the partner country that human rights and democracy 
concerns are not actually that important.  
A second explanation focuses on the weak institutional structure upon which the 
Euro-Med partnership rests, with a particular focus on the divisions among member states on 
the most appropriate strategies to follow. While such institutional difficulties may explain 
failures in other policy areas, this argument is not particularly convincing when it comes to 
EU-Morocco relations. This is specifically the case because the EU has substantial 
autonomy and independence in external trade relations and could use this leverage to obtain 
concessions from Morocco on human rights matters. This is, however, not done, which 
indicates the unwillingness of the EU to act rather than the impossibility to take action due to 
the disputes among member states.  
A third explanation that is offered by EU officials is that human rights abuses and 
lack of open democratic governance are much less of a problem in Morocco than in 
countries such as China and North Korea and therefore the country should be treated 
differently. This sentiment transpires quite clearly from the examination of official EU 
documents, which are always quite flattering of Morocco’s efforts to improve its situation 
despite clear evidence pointing in the opposite direction.5  This explanation seems to 
suggest that the EU refrains from ‘lecturing Morocco’ about democracy and human rights 
because the King is ‘not so bad after all’ (‘relative nice dictator’), and in addition, he is 
making an effort to bring about real change. However, this explanation fails to be satisfactory 
on two grounds. First of all, the very core of normative values is that abuses should all be 
treated and dealt with in the same way. In philosophical terms, an abuse of human rights is 
an abuse of human rights and the reaction to it should be the same irrespective of the scale 
of such abuses. When it comes to democracy, Schlumberger  (2000: 104-132) convincingly 
argues that ranking countries according to degrees of democracy weakens the very notion of 
democracy because at the end of the day you either are or are not a democracy. Secondly, 
                                                     
5 Authors’ interview with EU senior official, Dublin, March 2005.  
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the EU operates according to a very different logic in similar contexts. Thus, the EU actually 
lectures countries about human rights abuses and specifically sets out strict criteria for 
admission into the EU as the cases of Turkey and Croatia have recently shown. The 
argument that Morocco is not in the same category because it is not a prospective member 
does not hold much sway given that the EU also lectures countries as different as Cuba and 
the Ukraine.  
Traditional realist explanations seem to be more convincing in explaining the EU’s 
attitudes and policies towards Morocco than the ones examined in the previous paragraphs. 
In fact a combination of an ‘economic’ with a ‘geo-strategic’ explanation provide a much 
better framework for understanding the EU’s policy-making activities vis-a-vis Morocco. The 
argument underpinning the economic explanation is that the EU has material reasons to 
marginalise issues of democracy and human rights. The main thrust of the Euro-Med 
Partnership, in spite of its rhetorical commitment to the universal values of the UN Charter, is 
the economic integration of the countries on the southern bank of the Mediterranean into the 
European economic sphere of influence. This is of particular value to the EU because of the 
energy resources and the workforce the region has. Furthermore the area can be a very 
significant market for European consumer goods. The Euro-Med sets the goal of 2010 for full 
liberalisation of trade (with the exclusion of agriculture) with the partner countries. Since the 
launch of the Euro-Med partnership, the EU has increased trade, investment and exports to 
Morocco. All the relevant figures have been steadily rising and they are all in favour of the 
EU. 
Upsetting such favourable trade benefits does not feature in the EU’s agenda. 
Nevertheless, it acts as a rational actor who pays attention to material benefits and not only 
to normative values. EU officials involved more directly with democracy-promotion strategies 
also confirm this. In this respect, it is worth mentioning that the EU emphasises the role of an 
independent and active civil society to bring about democracy in the region and thus co-
finances projects aimed at increasing the level of civil society activism, particularly among 
the younger generations. This is done through programmes like Euro-Med Youth. In spite of 
the large number of projects carried out during the last decade (over 800 projects were 
financed to bring together youths from the two sides of the Mediterranean), the programme 
only touched 20,000 people (all partner countries included). This indicates that this is a 
rather low-level priority compared to the much more prominent economic links.6  
                                                     
6 Authors’ interview with Commission official, Brussels, March 2005.  
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The ‘economic’ interests alone, however, do not tell the whole story and there is the 
need to include an explanation based on the very ‘realist’ belief that stability is more 
important than democracy when it comes to the Mediterranean. In terms of political reforms 
in Morocco, the best outcome for the European Union would be a process of democratisation 
that brings to power a popularly elected leadership that is both secular and keen on 
continuing the same type of political and economic relationships that the current government 
subscribes to. This would entail the emergence of a very strong, liberal opposition to the 
King that is able to both marginalise the King politically (forcing him to cede substantial 
powers) and to outmanoeuvre the very popular Islamic movements, whose democratic 
credentials are not proven. This outcome is quite unlikely in the current situation. The largest 
opposition party at the moment in an emasculated parliament is the Islamic Party of 
Development and Justice. In addition to that, the most popular civil society movement in 
Morocco is an even more radical Islamic formation led by Sheikh Yassine. The popularity of 
the secular opposition has been constantly diminishing, as it is perceived by large sectors of 
the public as being thoroughly compromised. Thus, in these conditions, the EU cannot really 
attain the outcome it actually favours and it settles for the second best outcome, which is a 
rather stable and friendly authoritarian regime. It is far better to help Mohammed VI to stay in 
power than forcing elections that might throw up a leadership that questions many of the 
policies that the EU seems to be satisfied with when it comes to Morocco. The risk of an 
Islamist party coming to power through democratic means is not worth taking if it sacrifices 
the perceived stability of the region.7 There is substantial evidence to demonstrate that an 
Islamist party in government may want to adopt policies that may be perceived as being 
antagonistic to the interests of the EU.  
If stability is the name of the game, this proves that the EU is acting rationally rather 
than normatively, otherwise democracy would be promoted irrespective of the consequences 
for the EU’s interests in the country.  
Conclusion 
  As suggested by Leonard, it is probably true to assert that the European Union is 
very much a normative entity and that it is, above all, a community of values. But as this 
article tried to show such values represent only the outer framework of policies that have a 
very substantial degree of realism and rationalism, where the normative values clash with 
                                                     
7 Authors’ interview with leading member of the European Parliament, Brussels, June 2001.  
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the imperatives of security, interests and short-terms gains. Thus, a realist conception of 
European foreign policy and of the Euro-Mediterranean partnership specifically has to be 
introduced in order to capture the entire essence of EU policy-making with respect to 
countries and regions that have very little prospects of becoming full members. Only a 
combination of both theoretical considerations draws a rather complete picture.  
 Thus, Partnership may be seen as a failure only if the theoretical vantage point is 
one that understands the EU and its actions as primarily informed by values. If we instead 
accept that the European Union carries within its internal structure the contradictions derived 
from the interaction between the realist and the ideational, we can have a much more 
positive judgement of the results achieved through the Partnership and a much more 
coherent understanding of the policies implemented.  
Security and stability have been achieved if we take into account that no conflicts 
have occurred in the region, that non-proliferation has been a feature of the relationship 
despite the deterioration of the Middle East Peace Process and that the domestic stability of 
the Arab partners has continued. The case of Morocco seems to indicate that stability and 
security (irrespective of how softly interpreted) are ‘core norms’ for the European Union and 
the marginalisation of other core norms such as democracy and human rights is a political 
sacrifice worth paying if the benefits outweigh the costs. This is quite traditional realist 
thinking and policy-making and seems to confirm the validity of the critique of “normative” 
Europe that Hyde-Price (2006) recently postulated. In addition, it should be emphasised that 
such a realist interpretation is not due only to the overbearing influence of member states 
within EU policy-making in the partnership. While it is beyond doubt that some member 
states aim at utilising external EU policies to promote and defend their narrow national 
interests, it should also be highlighted that the Commission and other EU institutions enjoy a 
wide degree of latitude in making certain decisions due to its expertise, presence on the 
territory and to the divisions that exist among member states. While the Commission is far 
from being the rational and unitary actor that realists see as central in the international 
system, it has a rather important role to play as the process of integration deepens and skills 
and competencies are transferred to the supranational level.  
 If and when the European Union truly becomes a single actor in world politics, it will 
very likely subscribe to the largely ‘realist’ tendencies that permeate and characterise the 
international system. At any rate, the case of the EMP and Morocco suggests that it behaves 
just as ‘ruthlessly’ as nation-states do.          
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